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An Economic Model for Bioprospecting Contracts
Summary
This paper explores the use of a micro-economic model to analyse the provisions and
parties of bioprospecting contracts. It focuses on the pharmaceutical industry as the
representative biodiversity buyer, presenting an original theoretical framework that
explains the main contract characteristics or stylised facts. Against this background, it
considers the main contractors involved in these private contracts, i.e. biodiversity
sellers and biodiversity buyers, analysing both the magnitude and distribution of the
respective payoffs. Particular attention is devoted to the different, mixed impacts of
bioprospecting contracts and patenting on social welfare. The positive welfare impacts
delivered by bioprospecting contracts are associated with the potential discovery of a
new drug product, i.e. productivity gains, non-monetary benefit-sharing or transfers and
royalty revenues. The negative welfare impact results from the legal creation of a
monopoly and the related well-known effect on the consumer surplus. Finally, the
potential redistribution effects are limited, and a potential enforcement of this objective
may jeopardise the desirability of the contracts since this action would lead to a
significant increase in the transaction costs.
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1.

Introduction

The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), launched after the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro
in 1992, clarified and recognised the sovereign property rights of each country over their own
biodiversity resources. The CBD has stated the important legal principle: each country has
sovereign property rights over the biodiversity within its jurisdiction, and is able to obtain truthful
information about the use of genetic resources, to control the access procedures and to equitably
negotiate the benefit-sharing items with the biodiversity prospectors.
By attempting to rule out open access to bioprospecting1, the CBD (1992) has established an
important legal and economic principle: biodiversity conservation has a (market and non market)
value. Therefore, biodiversity value can be negotiated with and embodied into some kind of
governance structures.
Within the framework of this new institutional context, the result has been a remarkable
increase in the number of bio-prospecting contracts between the Biodiversity Buyers (BB), notably
linked to the pharmaceutical industry (e.g. Glaxo), and Biodiversity Sellers (BS), mainly local
research institutes operating in geographical areas where a broad range of biodiversity is present
(e.g. INBio in Costa Rica). In addition, the number of international institutions (e.g. ICBG)
involved in sample-screening activities has been observed to increase (Bhat 1999; Ten Kate and
Laird 1999; Dedeurwaerdere 2005).
Starting from this background, the present paper contains an economic analysis of
bioprospecting contracts. In particular, we adopt an inductive method that aims at a careful reading
and understanding of a selection of existing bioprospecting contracts. We then adopt standard
microeconomic analysis in order to define the contractors’ objective functions. This is preliminary
to deriving original insights that help to capture and understand the main motivations of the

1

For the purposes of the study at issue, bioprospecting is defined as the set of activities aiming at collecting, sampling
and screening genetic resources, including plants, animals, micro-organisms, as well as sharing indigenous knowledge
with significant potential to develop new market products.
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stakeholders involved in the bioprospecting negotiation. We focus on explaining the “why” of
bioprospecting contracts and parties by scrutinising the provisions of selected bioprospecting
contracts in order to understand the way parties organise their transactions.
This is important because “understanding how and why economic agents use contracts to
coordinate their activities is crucial to understanding the organization and efficiency of economic
exchange” (Masten and Saussier, 2002, p. 273)
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides insights into the pharmaceutical industry
characteristics and bioprospecting activities. Section 3 contains a review of a number of existing
contracts worldwide in order to identify their main provisions and parties, and to interpret the
contracts from the perspective of transaction costs theory. Section 4 presents an original theoretical
framework that explains the observed and reviewed stylised facts so as to study the different
steering forces involved in the two parties’ objective functions. Section 5 includes a welfare
analysis of the bioprospecting contracts and patenting. Section 6 concludes.

2.

Pharmaceutical Research and Bioprospecting Contracts: Some Background
Information

Despite alternative definitions and clarifications available in the literature2, in this article the
pharmaceutical research process will be defined in terms of a set of discrete steps including: (1)
field collection of genetic resources, (2) drug discovery, and (3) drug development – see Figure 1. It
is important to note that the last step of pharmaceutical research, with regard to drug development,
is the internal research and development (R&D) activity carried out by the pharmaceutical
companies. The inputs of the R&D process, in the form of screened samples, are normally

2

For example, according to Kate and Laird, pharmaceutical research refers to the “process of discovering, developing,
and bringing to market new ethical drug products” (ten Kate and Laird, 1999, pp. 49).

3
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purchased from another party involved in the first two steps, i.e. field collection of genetic resources
and drug discovery.

ex ante context of the contract

in situ context of the contract

 Prior Agreement:
Agreement on the rights
of access to and
utilization of GR &
Benefit-sharing regime

 Bioprospecting
Contract:
Contract on the screened
genetic resources and its
derivatives & Benefitsharing regime

Contractors: Sources
suppliers & BS

- Covered bioprospecting
activities:
Field collection

Step 2. Drug
discovery

Step 3. Drug
development

- Covered bioprospecting
activities:
1. Processing the extracts,
2. Screening,
3. Identifying the active
agents and their chemical
structure

- (Internal R&D)
Covered research activities:
1. Chemical
improvements to the
drug molecule,
2. Pre-clinical studies,
Clinical trials,
3. Approval of regulatory
agency

The Entire Pharmaceutical Research Process

Step 1. Genetic
resources field

Contractors: BS & BB

Figure 1 Pharmaceutical research and bioprospecting contract

To distinguish these two parties, we name them biodiversity buyer (BB) and biodiversity seller
(BS), respectively. In this context, bioprospecting contracts play an important role in bringing
together the BB and BS in a legal negotiation framework, so as to complete the entire
pharmaceutical research process. The following sub-sections will discuss these three steps and the
associated bioprospecting activities, and will explore the role of bioprospecting contracts.

2.1.

Field collection of genetic resources
4

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2007

5

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 161 [2007]

The general conditions for the collection of genetic resources are negotiated between source
suppliers3 and BS. This agreement explicitly clarifies a set of mutually agreed upon terms: (a) the
access to and the use of genetic resources in the source country, which is subject to the Prior
Informed Consent (PIC) and benefit-sharing treaty, and (b) the restricted manner in which field
collection and follow-up research will be conducted. The outcome of the field collection will be
further elaborated by the BS, who are granted exclusive access to the genetic resource, while patent
rights cover their discoveries in the area under consideration. In many cases, BS refer to local
research institutes or universities. This geographical affinity contributes to the establishment of a
firm or of a close relationship with the national or local government in the source country. As a
matter of fact, these same institutions are often involved in bioprospecting contract negotiations
with international pharmaceutical industries, on behalf of the source country. As we can see in
Figure 2, genetic resources have an important role in the discovery of new natural drugs or in
serving as a source of leads for synthesising new compound structures or products (Ten Kate and
Laird 2000; Onaga 2001).
In addition to the local BS mentioned above, in Table 1 we can identify major international
institutes that have been involved in biocontracting as biodiversity sellers. In this context
international BS contribute to generating additional funding for bioprospecting projects and to
supplying technical assistance in capacity-building to the source suppliers. Moreover, as far as
benefit-sharing rules are concerned, the transfer of technology from the BS to the source suppliers
contributes to strengthening the research ability and efficiency of the source-based institutes. In
effect, we can observe a potential increase in the added-value of genetic resources. Furthermore,
another important characteristic is that many international research organisations (such as ICBG)

Source suppliers refer to the stakeholders located in source countries that originally have property rights over genetic
resources and/or indigenous knowledge. They are important suppliers of raw genetic materials for BS to achieve drug
discovery process. However, their cooperating relationship is usually established by a number of informal agreements
or authorisation procedures rather than a legal contact, as in most cases BS are national research institutions located in
the source countries. For this reason they receive financial support from the local government to conduct the
fundamental research related to biodiversity. This condition will be further illustrated in section 4 by means of a review
of bioprospecting contracts.

3
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carry out several research programs in different countries. For this reason, the research results and
database generated in all collaborative countries will be shared within the involved institutes. As a
consequence, the sharing of systematic information on processing genetic resources can contribute
to reducing the financial costs of field collection assumed by companies and institutes. In other
words, it will be possible to provide higher quality samples or synthetic compounds, or obtain the
same sample processing results with a lower field collection effort, and thus reduce the pressure of
habitat loss and species extinction. (ICBG 1997; Rausser and Small 2000).

Samples of extracts of
genetic resources

Natural product discovery

Chemically modified
drug

Source of leads for
product development

Discover unknown
structure of compounds

Synthetic compounds
based on existing
compounds

Synthesises,
recombinant DNA

Drug Discovery

An integral part of drug
discovery

Chemical improvement
on drug molecule

Drug candidates

Drug Development

Pre-clinical and clinical
trials

Approval process

Marketing new drug
products

Figure 2 The contribution of natural products to pharmaceutical research
Source: Ten Kate and Laird 1999 (adapted).

In conclusion it is important to highlight that all the negotiations involving genetic source
suppliers and BS are informal agreements and do not represent the core of bioprospecting contracts.
For more information about the involved procedures, see Nunes et al. (2006).
6
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2.2.Drug discovery
Drug discovery refers to the set of fundamental research activities carried out by the BS, including
the processing of extracts and the screening of samples. The expected output of these activities is
the identification of active compounds and their chemical structure, exploring their potential value
in pharmaceutical products. As shown in Figure 2, the novel compounds derived from the collected
samples can directly contribute to a new natural drug on the market. However, most of the collected
genetic materials will serve as a source of leads for drug development (see Section 2.3), and will be
closely related to the success in drug R&D. For example, high quality samples are helpful for
discovering valuable research leads, which will increase the efficiency of innovation activities (i.e.
increase the probability of generating a successful market product with R&D). In addition, research
leads derived from high quality samples can provide adequate taxonomical, geographical, and
ecological information, and can consequently increase the productivity of discoveries, reduce the
need of new field collection, and ultimately result in a decrease in searching costs. Therefore, it is
not difficult to conclude that for a pharmaceutical company (i.e. BB), it is not necessary to carry out
drug discovery research by itself, but it does matter to select a good collaborator (i.e. BS), who is
able to do the best job in sample extracting and screening. Generally speaking, the criteria taken
into account by companies include inter alia the ability of the biodiversity sellers in providing
biologically and chemically diverse samples, the simplicity and legislation of the process to obtain
samples, and the prices of the samples (see Ten Kate and Laird 2000 for more details). The
cooperation relationship can be established within a legal framework (i.e. bioprospecting contract)
upon a number of commonly agreed items, including the exchanged commodities (i.e. processed
genetic resources) and the benefit-sharing regimes, covering both monetary and non-monetary
benefits – see Table 1.
In a formal bioprospecting contract, we can observe a direct monetary payment transferred from
the pharmaceutical companies to biodiversity sellers (or sample suppliers) in the form of sample

7
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fees4, advanced payments, milestone payments and the royalties (see Ten Kate and Laird 1999, for
more details). In this case, it is important to note that the price of genetic resources increases when
the collected material is subject to additional screening and processing activities performed by the
biodiversity seller. In short, biodiversity sellers can be responsible for the creation of market addedvalue to the originally extracted genetic resources. In addition, an advanced payment is undertaken
for compensating the general operational cost of the research institutes. A milestone payment is
required when new discoveries are made in the research and development (R&D) phase. In many
cases, a royalty is also calculated based on the net sales for commercialised products. Obviously,
the amount of milestone and royalty payments depends upon the success in R&D.
In addition, the non-monetary payment (e.g. technology transfer and capacity-building) incurred
by pharmaceutical companies is widely recognised to be far more important than the financial
benefits from bioprospecting activities obtained by BS, in particular the local BS in the source
country (Rosenthal et al. 1999; Ten Kate and Laird 2000; Onaga 2001). By collaborating with
international pharmaceutical industries, these BS can enhance their scientific database and
biotechnology in sample screening via a set of non-monetary benefit-sharing terms in the contract,
including technology transfer, internal personnel training, capacity-building, and sharing of research
results and biological databases.
For instance, sharing databases on the indigenous genetic resource and chemical structure of the
samples provided by the BS can directly provide useful, valuable information for the efficient
design of future sample guidelines. In other words, this contributes to fine-tuning the scope sample
collection activities, saving money by avoiding unnecessary field collection for genetic resources.
Moreover, the shared technology can improve the overall sample quality when it is applied to
sample extraction and screening. This will not only contribute to increasing the probability of

4

According to Artuso (2002), the value of raw biological material as an input in the research or production of these
products is significantly lower than the value of finished products containing or derived from biochemical resources.

8
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generating success in drug discovery, but also to enhancing the long-term benefits for biodiversity
sellers due to the increasing added-value of each sample.

2.3.Drug development
Drug development is usually carried out by the pharmaceutical companies (i.e. the BB) and it is
based on pharmaceutical research efforts or commitments (see Figure 1). The first target is to
discover productive research leads, associating their role to the reduction of production costs.
Another target refers to the greater probability of success in developing a new drug. In both cases,
research and innovation activities contribute to increasing the competitiveness of the private
company and its products.
Some authors argue that the innovation capability is closely dependent on the research capacity
of individual companies as well as on their additional investments in R&D processes (DiMasi et al.
1991; Ten Kate and Laird 1999). The latter, however, requires a strong financial commitment by
private companies. Empirical analyses of the estimated R&D costs to develop new drugs consist of
the costs related to on-going discovery and development activities, as well as of the costs of failed
projects (DiMasi et al. 1991; Simpson et al. 1996). Recent calculation indicates that the largest
companies spend more than a billion dollars per year on pharmaceutical research and development
activities (ICBG 1997). Finally, in the scenario where R&D is found to be successful, the private
company incurs additional costs to apply for approval from the regulatory agency, and royalties.
Independently of the sum of R&D investment, one cannot ex ante guarantee the marketable
success of each research lead. Instances like INBio and ICBG projects, and marine bioprospecting
projects all point out that the current sampling and synthesis techniques are very expensive
processes with limited success. Similar findings obtained by Polski (2005) indicate that, in the U.S.,
on average 10 years are needed to bring a new drug to market at a cost of 800 million dollars. Large
amounts of money are spent on research and development, in which only one every 5,000

9

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper161

10

Ding et al.: An Economic Model for Bioprospecting Contracts

compounds may be identified and marketed as a drug. Finally, less than 15% of all drugs can
generate revenues large enough to compensate the cost of research development (Polski 2005;
Standard and Poor’s Corporation 2003).
If, however, the R&D succeeds, the private company receives large monetary returns from the
successful new commercial product. According to the 1994 statistics of the International
Development Research Centre, many of the most commonly used drugs in Western medicine are
derived from tropical plants and are worth 32 billion dollars a year in sales worldwide (Merson
2000). In 2002, an estimated 2.4 billion dollars were obtained from global sales of marine
biotechnology products (Ruth 2006). This is one of the main incentives for big industries that are
keen on investing in bio-prospecting, and that keep land aside for the conservation of the genetic
resources for future research.

2.4. The role of Patenting or Intellectual Property Rights
The issue regarding intellectual property rights (IPR) is central to the debate concerning the
utilisation of genetic resources and their derivatives in bioprospecting contracts. In pharmaceutical
research in particular, the clear definition of intellectual property rights is essential to facilitate
R&D collaboration and to protect knowledge before the formalisation of technology exchange
arrangements, so that the security, distribution and exploitation of the initial inventions can be
guaranteed by legislations (Thumm 2005).
It is clear that high quality research leads, derived from the extraction, processing and screening
activities provided by biodiversity sellers, are the key elements driving the evolution of
pharmaceutical research in the context of bioprospecting. As a matter of fact, pharmaceutical
research on natural products, according to some authors ( e.g. Simpson et al. 1996), is more often
intended to develop “leads” than to identify natural products. Moreover, the IPR on the novel
compounds and chemical structures discovered in pharmaceutical research are always associated

10
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with the patenting rights on their downstream applications by the contractual partners. This requires
biodiversity sellers to protect the IPR over their new discoveries, and to guarantee the benefits in
the form of royalty payments arising from their patented innovations. The royalty payments can
therefore be interpreted as the economic price to use the patented research leads and biochemical
compounds.
In addition, for the pharmaceutical industry alone, there are significant incentives involved in
patenting their product innovations so as to protect past investment efforts and fend off market
competitors, e.g. free riders. Generally speaking, internal R&D is a costly activity associated with
high risks. Some figures have shown that although there is only a slim probability (about 10 of
10000) that synthesised chemical compounds are successful as market products, pharmaceutical
companies have to patent each compound in view of the fact that it might lead to the next
blockbuster (Cardinal and Hatfield 2000). Pharmaceutical companies therefore have an increasing
need for Intellectual Property Protection so as to obtain high revenues from their new drugs to make
up for their large investment efforts and to deal with potential new competitors in the market. In the
next section, we shall discuss the role of patenting in more detail.
The effects of IPR have to be analysed from two points of view. On the one hand, patent rights
grant the holder exclusion power from research or exclusion power from the market. They
encourage the creation of new, economically valuable knowledge and increase competitiveness
within an appropriate regulatory framework (Musu 2005; Thumm 2005). On the other hand, many
critics believe that the patent system creates entry barriers and overly strong monopoly positions,
thus hindering the development of new knowledge (Lawson 2004; Musu 2005; Thumm 2005). In
the remaining body of the paper, we attempt to apply a formal economic analysis so as to identify
the different patenting schemes involved in pharmaceutical bioprospecting contracts and their
economic impacts on stakeholders’ objective functions, the overall level of genetic resource
protection and human welfare.

11

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper161

12

Ding et al.: An Economic Model for Bioprospecting Contracts

3. Bioprospecting Contracts: Some Stylised Facts
The paragraph provides an overview of a selection of existing bioprospecting contracts and an
economic analysis of the most important provisions. Stylised facts show that the most frequently
adopted governance structure is represented by long-term contracts, mostly signed between public
research institutions and biotechnological- pharmaceutical multinationals, all over the world.
A well-known presented case is, for instance, the bioprospecting contract between the INBionational biodiversity institute of Costa Rica, and Merck Pharmaceutical Ltd. in 1991. Merck was
granted the right to evaluate the commercial prospects of a limited number of plant, insect, and
microbial samples collected in Costa Rica’s 11 conservation areas, from which INBio gained US$1
million over two years and equipment for processing samples and scientific training from Merck. In
addition, the agreement addressed a share of potential royalties and technology transfer to develop
local sample preparation and screening capabilities. INBio agreed to invest 10% of all the payments
and half of the royalties by Merck into the Conservation Areas (Mulholland and Wilman 1998;
Merson 2000; Nunes and Bergh 2001; Artuso 2002). This kind of agreement leads to different
interests in genetic resources, crucial input for research and development (R&D), and thus results in
different contractual specifications. For instance, industries of botanical medicines, personal care
and commercial agriculture traditionally depend upon plant genetic resources, but biotechnological
companies and pharmaceutical companies always acquire material as raw samples, extracts from
plant genetic resources or ‘value-added’ genetic resources (Ten Kate and Laird 1999; 2000).
Table 1 contains a review of the most important provisions in a sample of 8 selected contracts,
stipulated world-wide.

12
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Table 1 A review on the existing bioprospecting contracts
Contractors and Legal
Nature of the parties

Date of
Signature,
Duration and

Contract
Payment of
biodiversity

R&D, Patenting and Biodiversity
Protection Obligations

Other Obligations

Possibility to
Renew
INBio (national
biodiversity institute of
Costa Rica, non-profit,
public interest
organization

1991
(2 years)

Lump-sum
transfer

Renewable

& Bristol-Myers Squibb,
Monsanto, and Glaxo
Wellcome (consortium
of private companies)
European botanical
Gardens (EU public
institutions)
& U.S. Phytera (private
company)

TBGRI (Tropical
Botanical Garden and
Research Institute in
Kerala, public
institutions)

1993
(5 years)

Lump-sum
transfer

Renewable

1996
(11 years)

1996

Payment per
plant

& Diversa (private
company)

- Common use of
the resource

- No Royalties Sharing
- No technology transfer to
develop local preparations and
screening

No Exclusive
contracts
- Common use of
the resource

- Royalties Sharing
- No technology transfer to
develop local preparations and
screening

Exclusive contracts
- Common use of
the resource

- No Obligation for the private
company to financially contribute
to protect biodiversity
Lump-sum
transfer

Renewable

& Arya Vaidya
Pharmacy Coimbator Ltd
(private company)

Yellowstone National
Park (U.S. public
institution)

No Exclusive
contracts

- Obligation for the private
company to financially contribute
to protect biodiversity

Renewable

(11 years)

-Technology transfer to develop
local preparations and screening
capabilities
- Obligation for the private
company to financially contribute
to protect biodiversity

&Merck (private
company)
ICBG (International
Cooperative Biodiversity
Group, U.S:
governmental venture)

- Royalties Sharing

- Royalties Sharing
-Technology transfer to develop
local preparations and screening
capabilities. Investment in the Kani
Community for human capital
formation

Exclusive contracts
- Common use of
the resource

- Obligation for the private
company to financially contribute
to protect biodiversity
1997
(10 years)

Lump-sum
transfer

Renewable

Royalties Sharing
- No Technology transfer to
develop local preparation and
screening capabilities.

No Exclusive
contracts
- Common use of
the resource

- No Obligation for the private
company to financially contribute
to protect biodiversity

13
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Table 1 A review on the existing bioprospecting contracts (cont.)
Contractors and Legal
Nature of the parties

Date of
Signature,
Duration and

Contract
Payment of
biodiversity

R&D, Patenting and Biodiversity
Protection Obligations

Other Obligations

Possibility to
Renew
CSIR (The Bio/Chemtek
division of South
Africa’s Commission on
Scientific and Industrial
Research, public
institution) & Diversa
(private company)

1998
(9 years )

No monetary
transfer

Renewable

Brazilian Extracta
(public institution)

1999
(3 years)

& Glaxo Wellcome
(private company)

Non
Renewable

No Royalties Sharing
Technology transfer to develop
local preparations and screening
capabilities for traditional healers

Exclusive contracts
- Common use of
the resource

No Obligation for the private
company to financially contribute
to protect biodiversity
Lump-sum
transfer

Royalties Sharing
Technology transfer to develop
local preparation and screening
capabilities

No Exclusive
contracts
- Common use of
the resource

Obligation for the private company
to financially contribute to protect
biodiversity

Department of Chemistry
University of South
Pacific (public
institution)
& Smith Kline Beecham
(private company)

1995
(3 years)

Non Monetary

Royalties Sharing
Technology transfer to develop
local preparation and screening
capabilities. Investment in the
Verata Community for human
capital formation

Renewable

Exclusive contracts
- Common use of
the resource

Obligation for the private company
to financially contribute to protect
biodiversity

Sources: (Breibart 1997; ICBG 1997; Mulholland and Wilman 1998; Neto and Dickson 1999; Ten Kate and Laird
1999; Merson 2000; Artuso 2002; Greer and Harvey 2004; Dedeurwaerdere et al. 2005)

Though very different in peculiarities, the selected contracts present a set of common features
and provisions.
First, despite the various entities of the existing bioprospecting contracts, and the wide range of
stakeholders, it is possible to identify two main parties to the agreement.
1) Biodiversity Sellers (BS) are generally public institutions of various types (e.g. botanic
gardens, universities, research institutions, and gene banks). The BS have an important role
14
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as contractors with the (pharmaceutical) private companies, since they serve private
companies with the screened samples, novel compounds and discovered research leads
derived from their field collections in association with the appropriate freedom for new drug
development. In addition, they are responsible for obtaining a granted permission of access
to genetic resources, or indigenous knowledge, and collaborate with the private companies
in the development and marketing of these resources. In doing this, they have to enter into
separate contracts or other agreements with both source suppliers and private companies. In
addition, BS (formally or informally) negotiate with the source suppliers5 so as to obtain the
permission to exploit the access to the genetic resource. Such permission, therefore, enables
BS to conduct field collection.
2) Biodiversity Buyers (BB) are mostly pharmaceutical multinational companies and represent
another contractual party. This stakeholder is characterised by its notable research and
development (R&D) efforts on the commercial use of the genetic resources. Although
various private companies build their business on the commercialisation of genetic
resources, the pharmaceutical industry undoubtedly represents the largest global market.
Some figures indicate that global sales of pharmaceuticals are estimated to exceed $300
billion per annum. The component of sales derived from genetic resources or pure natural
products accounts for some $75-150 billion (Grifo et al. 1997; Ten Kate and Laird 1999).
Pharmaceutical multinational companies invest a higher proportion of their sales in R&D
than most other industries, such as botanical medicines, personal care, commercial
agriculture, and crop protection companies, but they also incur a higher risk in drug
discovery and development process (See Table 2). For this reason, pharmaceutical

5

Source suppliers have been defined in section 2. This group formally consists of source countries’ governments, local
management entities and indigenous people/communities (e.g. the Kanis), some of which have the ability to grant
permission for the access to, and use of, genetic resources and their derivatives, such as the national
governments/organisations(e.g. Brazilian Extracta). Source suppliers also include the stakeholder groups that have
access to traditional knowledge, on the basis of which the private companies may directly profit or make new and
improved products (e.g. CSIR South Africa). For further information, see Nunes et al. (2006).
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companies play a crucial role as steering engines in driving the progress of bioprospecting
contracts. The next section focuses on the economic analysis of the pharmaceutical industry
only, where the stakeholders originally referred to as BB will represent the pharmaceutical
companies/industry.

Table 2 Comparison of duration and cost of typical research and development programmes in
different industry sectors.

Sector

Years to develop

Cost (US$ m)

Pharmaceutical

10-15 or more

231-500

Botanical medicines

Less than 2 to 5

0.15-7

Commercial agricultural seed

8 to12

1-2.5

Transgene

4 or more

35-75

Ornamental horticulture

1 to 20 or more

0.05-5

Crop Protection

2 to 5 (biocontrol agent)

1-5

8 to 14 (chemical pesticide)

40-100

Industrial enzymes

2 to 5

2-20

Personal care and cosmetic

Less than 2 to 5

0.15-7

Source: Ten Kate and Laird 1999, page 9

Second, the agreements’ core provision is an exchange obligation: parties trade the possibility to
get screened samples of biological material in exchange for a monetary payment (in some cases this
is not due) and some other mutual obligations. There are three essential contractual obligations:
1) the possibility (or not) to share royalty revenues if the pharmaceutical multinationals patent a
new drug discovery thanks to the R&D activities performed on the genetic material sold in
the contract;
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2) the possibility (or not) for the pharmaceutical multinationals to transfer R&D technology
and screening capabilities to the local institutions; and/or the possibility (or not) to train (?)
local human capital;
3) the possibility (or not) for the pharmaceutical multinationals to financially contribute to
protect biodiversity with the partial transfer of the royalty revenues.
Moreover, contracts generally include ancillary provisions like the possibility to share the use of the
resource and the attribution (or not) of exclusive exploitation rights.
Third, all the contracts are long-term and (mostly) renewable. This contractual feature is well
explained by Transaction Cost Economics6 (TCE) that acknowledges the role of contract terms in ex
ante aligning marginal incentives and in preventing wasteful efforts to ex post redistribution of
existing surplus. In order to achieve this twofold objective, contract terms have several dimensions
(price provisions; incompleteness level; duration) that allow the transaction(s) at stake to adapt to
the regulated contingencies and circumstances. From this perspective, long-term contracts represent
the most effective cost-minimising structure to govern transactions. When uncertainty, complexity
and asset specificity7 are significant, internal organisation (and/or long-term contracts) is likely to

6

Firms and markets are different, alternative governance structures and the existence of one or the other depends on
how transaction costs are minimised. Transaction costs characterise market activities (a transaction is defined as any use
of the market, whether for buying or selling). “There is a cost of using the price mechanism. By forming an organisation
and allowing some authority (an entrepreneur) to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are saved”. The
essential reasoning presented by Coase (1937) is an equilibrium condition: “a firm will tend to expand until the cost of
organising an extra transaction within the firm becomes equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by
means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of organising in another firm.”
In Williamson’s framework (1975, 1979, 1983, 1985), there is no simple dichotomy between market transactions and
internal organisation. Rather, there is a continuum, with simple spot market transactions at one extreme, internal
organisation (horizontal and vertical) at the other, and a wide range of more complicated contractual relationships in
between. Transaction costs depend on transactions uncertainty, opportunistic behaviour, asset specificity and bounded
rationality
7
Williamson identifies four types of asset-specificity:
1. site-specificity: once sited the assets are very immobile.
2. physical asset specificity: when parties make investments in machinery or equipment that are specific to a
certain transaction and these have lower values in alternative uses.
3. dedicated assets: general investment by a supplier or buyer that would otherwise not be made but for the
prospect of transacting a specific (large) amount an item with a particular partner. If the contract is prematurely
terminated, the supplier (who invested) would be with excess capacity/ the buyer would be with unexpected
excess demand.
4. human asset specificity: workers’ acquired skills, know-how and information that is more valuable inside a
particular transaction than outside it.
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be a superior arrangement for governing transactions. On the contrary, the market will represent the
most efficient form of governance, when uncertainty and asset specificity are not important and
transactions are not complex. In this case, contract terms are simple and approximate spot market
transactions.
According to the TCE approach, the contracting parties involved in a specific relationship use
vertical integration and long-term contracts to limit ex post bargaining inefficiencies due to hold-up,
thereby minimising the resulting loss in ex ante investment. This approach predicts a positive
correlation between vertical integration (and/or long-term contracts) and the degree of relation
specificity. Vertical integration should enhance both parties’ investments positively in the TCE
approach.
Bioprospecting activities are certainly characterised by high levels of asset specificity, in
particular site specificity, since particular genetic materials are sited in particular locations, and
dedicated assets, since the pharmaceutical companies invest in bioprospecting to exploit the
possibility of patenting new discoveries. In addition, bioprospecting is characterised by a high level
of uncertainty, because firms investing in R&D are uncertain of the probability of new drug
discoveries. Finally, bioprospecting is characterised by high levels of complexity, because it is an
activity generating several (positive and negative) impacts on biodiversity exploitation, on research,
on innovation, on firms’ competitiveness, on wealth redistribution.
Long-term contracts represent a way to minimise transaction costs, generated by uncertainty,
asset specificity and complexity in bioprospecting. Moreover, long-term contracts minimise
bureaucratic and administrative transaction costs that could be generated by other organisational
forms (public tenders, public authorisations implemented by countries with sovereign property
rights over the biodiversity within their jurisdiction), thus providing proper incentives

for
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pharmaceutical multinationals to invest in R&D, and bringing along the benefits prescribed for the
CBD.
Finally, the contracts prescribe for the payment of a biodiversity price, whose amount and
payment scheme is different in every contract8. For example, Merck paid US$ 1,135 (correct?)
million to INBio for the supply and screening of samples, while U.S. Phytera agreed to pay $15 per
plant to the EU botanical gardens. In addition, the parties agree to share (in different proportions)
the returns of the royalties should the bioprospecting activities generate a drug and thus obtain a
discovery patent. Some other contracts do not provide for monetary transfers (for instance, the
collaboration between the traditional healers and CSIR in bioprospecting has only promoted the
development of a data base of information on the traditional uses of South African plants, which
can help CSIR and its partners to make a preferential selection on the plants for screening.
Moreover, a formal agreement grants the application of benefit-sharing arrangements among the
contractors.

4. Modelling Bioprospecting Contracts
This section provides a theoretical economic perspective to identify, characterise and discuss the
interrelationships between contractors which are governed by bioprospecting contracts. The setting
and setup of the contracts is interpreted as a key element in revealing the underlying motivations
that induce the interested parties to subscribe to bioprospecting. As a consequence, the contract
improves our understanding of the strategic behaviour of contractors, and ultimately allows us to
evaluate the performance of bioprospecting contracts.
Bioprospecting contracts aim at ensuring the exclusive access to the genetic resources, based
upon the equitable and fair sharing of the benefits between the involved parties. This access can be
8

In a TCE approach, the contract price reflects the parties’ evaluation of the contract
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facilitated by a set of other accessory negotiations (for instance, authorisations/or collateral
agreements concerning the provision, or transfer, of the samples, chemical compounds and genetic
information derived from extracting and screening activities in the research institutes or
universities) with third interested parties (for instance local populations).
It therefore links the biodiversity sellers with the private companies through a set of mutual
agreements on the sharing of both monetary and non-monetary benefits on the use of genetic
materials and their derivatives.
Originally, collection, discovery and development were sequential processes in pharmaceutical
research, but they now tend to be conducted in parallel by both the pharmaceutical industry and
some collaborative institutions in order to reduce the development time. The industry alone is
responsible for conducting the drug development, but sometimes requires the biodiversity sellers
(that usually are public research institutions in the source country) to complete the fundamental
research for drug discovery, including the field collection, establishment of screening libraries, and
discovery of active compounds for pharmaceutical research. Hence, pharmaceutical companies are
legally entitled to the exclusive use of the given samples in association with the freedom of
developing these samples into natural products, research leads or synthetic compounds for new drug
discovery.
In the present study, we attempt to provide a formal analysis of the bioprospecting contract, by
highlighting the objective functions and objective function maximisation of the two main parties, in
order to provide a primer theoretical structure to the contract and to analyse the main (market)
impacts (for a theoretical study of contracts in the electricity and art markets, see Onofri, 2003(a)
and (b)). The impact of patents will be formalised in terms of their specific effects on the parties
and considerations, and respective impacts on the costs and benefits for all the involved contractors.
In the next subsections, we shall identify and assess the magnitude of such impacts.
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4.1 Modelling the biodiversity seller’s objective function
Given the condition that biological material suppliers voluntarily accept contractual bioprospecting
activities, the contract supply function for the biodiversity sellers (BS) can be formally expressed by
Formattato: Tipo di
carattere:Non Grassetto

equation (1):

Eliminato: (1)
Inserimento: (1)

y BS = F (s (θ ), L( B;θ ), T ( B;θ ) )

(1)

As we can see, the contract supply function is modelled as dependent (a) on the stock of genetic
material available to the seller, denoted by s; (b) on the human efforts, denoted by L; and
technology, denoted by T. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the seller does not pursue
autonomous R&D activities, meaning that T is not a direct control variable. However, it can benefit
from non-monetary sharing-benefits, such as technology transfer (e.g. funding of laboratory
equipment, modifications and maintenance; funding of computer system), that may come along
with the signature of the contract, and for this same reason T is modelled as dependent on B, the
amount of the parties’ bioprospecting effort (resulting in a number of pre-screened samples to trade
with the buyer) as established in the contract. Similarly, the signature of the contract can also
provide non-monetary benefits by improving the quality of the human capital employed in the
screening sampling process (e.g. formal training at local Universities and access to scientific
literature). Furthermore, here θ ≡ (θ L ,θT ) denotes a vector portraying a set of idiosyncratic
characteristics associated with the seller supply, including the quality of the local labour involved in
the sampling procedures, θ L ; the degree of access to technology as well as the quality of genetic
material collected from the source country, θT . These characteristics will be embedded in the
transaction specificity and reflected on the contractual seller’s position. This will be then signaling
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the seller’s bargaining power and the price of the contract9. At this stage, we can model the
expected profits10 of the BS as follows:

π BS = p B (B;θ ) ⋅ F (s(θ ), L( B;θ ), T ( B;θ ) ) − C (s, L, T , B ) + μRoy ( pat )

(2)

Eliminato: (2)

In first term in equation (2), pB denotes the price of the contract. As explained before, price is
assumed to be dependent on the idiosyncratic characteristics of the BS. The second term captures

Inserimento: (2)

Formattato: Inglese (Gran
Bretagna)

the production and transaction costs. This term includes the costs regarding the access to the
resources (e.g. when the material is not at the seller’s disposal this may refer to the costs of the
negotiations for authorisations with the local communities), the costs of labour and technology
employed by the seller, as well as the costs of negotiating, writing and enforcing the bioprospecting
contract. We assume that the cost function is characterised by economies of scale. In particular, we
assume that δC/δB > 0 and δ2C/δB2> 0.
Finally, the last term in equation (2), denotes the royalty benefits on the basis of the expected
value of a successful pharmaceutical product derived from the supplied patented compounds. The
parameter μ (with 0 < μ ≤ 1) represents the share from patent revenues that the BS will receive.

Formattato: Inglese (Gran
Bretagna)
Eliminato: (2)
Inserimento: (2)

Formattato: Inglese (Gran
Bretagna)

Against this background, the BS maximises its profits by choosing inter alia the amount of parties’
bioprospecting effort as established in the contract, i.e. B. Formally, we have

9

In this paper, the issue of the contractors’ bargaining power is voluntarily left as an “open” matter because of our
selected methodological inductive approach. We attempt to capture common features in selected, very different
bioprospecting contracts (whose parties will have different bargaining power, case by case). An alternative
methodological approach is the one provided by Gatti et al. (2005), that employ cooperative bargaining theory, to
examine whether bioprospecting contracts create incentives for protection of rich biodiversity lands. Building on Nash’s
idea of ‘rational threats’, the authors demonstrate that rather than removing the strategic incentives in the game of
surplus division, current arrangements may, in fact, generate such incentives.

10

Generally speaking, patenting may also cover a class of genetic materials and their broad applications (Lawson 2004).
It must therefore lead to a more active patenting behavior in response to the application or imitation of the patented
inventions by the external collaborators and competitors. Therefore, the BS has the possibility to patent new biological
components discovered during the screening process. This is not modeled because it is not the object of the formal
bioprospecting contract, core of the present analysis.
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Max
B

π BS = p B (B;θ ) ⋅ F (s(θ ), L( B;θ ), T ( B;θ ) ) − C (s, L, T , B ) + μ ⋅ E [Roy ( pat )]

(3)

The first order condition is:

∂π BS
∂F ∂T ⎤
∂p
∂C
⎡ ∂F ∂L
= pB ⎢
θL +
θ T ⎥ + y BS θ −
=0
∂B
∂
L
B
T
B
B
∂B
∂
∂
∂
∂
⎣
⎦

(4)

In other words, the optimal B* for the BS must satisfy equation (4). Equation (4) states that the
seller is willing to write the bio-prospecting contract until the marginal benefits resulting from this
action are equal to the marginal costs. According to equation (4), the marginal benefits are captured
by two separate components: non-monetary benefit transfer and contract price. The first component

∂F ∂T ⎤
⎡ ∂F ∂L
refers to p B ⎢
θL +
θ T . As we can see, this value depends on the qualitative changes
∂T ∂B ⎥⎦
⎣ ∂L ∂B
of the value of productivity that the contract can bring along with it due to the transfer of
technology and education. This magnitude is dependent on the parameters θ L and θT , and thus
reflecting the idiosyncratic characteristics of the BS with respect to the two inputs under
consideration. The second component refers to the potential effect of the idiosyncratic
characteristics of the BS on the definition of the price of the contract, signaling the seller’s
bargaining power, y BS

∂p
θ . The magnitude of these benefits needs to be compared with the
∂B

marginal costs associated to parties’ bioprospecting effort, the negotiating, writing and enforcing of
such a contract, i.e.

∂C
. Furthermore, we can highlight the following different scenarios regarding
∂B

the magnitude of the two main effects of the benefit components:
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∂F ∂T ⎤
∂p
∂p
⎡ ∂F ∂L
θL +
θ T ⎥ is larger than y BS θ , with y BS θ ≅ 0 , then we can
(a) when p B ⎢
∂B
∂B
∂T ∂B ⎦
⎣ ∂L ∂B
interpret this situation as signalling that the BS strongly values the non-monetary benefits
that the bioprospecting contract brings, even if the BS does not have a strong bargaining
power. This situation is illustrated, for example, in the CSIR & Diversa contract (see Table
1);
(b)

alternatively,

when

y BS

∂p
θ
∂B

is

larger

∂F ∂T ⎤
⎡ ∂F ∂L
than p B ⎢
θL +
θT ,
∂T ∂B ⎥⎦
⎣ ∂L ∂B

with

∂F ∂T ⎤
⎡ ∂F ∂L
pB ⎢
θL +
θ T ≅ 0 , then we can interpret this scenario as signalling that the BS
∂T ∂B ⎥⎦
⎣ ∂L ∂B
attaches a significant value to the monetary component of the marginal revenues from the
contract. This situation is illustrated, for example, in the Yellowstone & Diversa, ICBG &

Bristol-Myers Squibb-Monsanto-Glaxo Wellcome and European Botanical Gardens & US
Phytera contracts (see Table 1).

4.2 Modelling the biodiversity buyer’s objective functions
The production function for the biodiversity buyer (BB) can be described by the following equation:

y BB = G[ y BS (B; σ ), K (B; σ ), TI ( pat (B ); σ )]

(5)

in which, yBB is the yield of successfully developed drugs by the pharmaceutical company,
which is modelled as a function of the screened genetic material supplied, as foreseen in the
contract and denoted by yBS, the accumulated knowledge in the R&D process, denoted by K, and
technological investments, denoted by TI. K has a positive effect on yBB since it plays an important
role in increasing the probability of successfully developing new drugs. In a similar way, TI
positively influences the productivity of the pharmaceutical industry. It however, relies on the
24
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patentable innovations in the drug development process or the new products subject to the effort in
writing a bioprospecting contract. For this reason, this effect is expressed in equation (5) as
TI(pat(B)). Finally, the idiosyncratic characteristics of the BB are captured by the term σ and can
be interpreted inter alia in terms of the BB’s capability of undertaking R&D, market share in the
world market of drugs and medicines (and embedded market power). Therefore, the objective
function of the BB can be modelled as follows:

π BB = PD ⋅ G[ y BS (B;σ ), K (B;σ ), TI ( pat (B );σ )] − C ( y BS , B, TI , pat ) + (1 − μ )E [Roy ( pat (B );σ )]

(6)

The first term, PD ⋅ G[ y BS (B; σ ), K (B; σ ), TI ( pat (B ); σ )] in the equation (8) represents the total
revenues of successful new drugs in the market. PD represents the market price of the drug, which
is at this stage assumed to be exogenous to the BB (later we shall relax this assumption). The
second term calculates the total costs incurred by the pharmaceutical company: C denotes the total
costs, including the costs in purchasing screened samples from the BS, transaction costs, continual
investments in R&D, and the costs of patent application and renewal fees for the new drug products.
Finally, (1 − μ )E [Roy ( pat (B );σ )] is the BB’s share of the expected royalties. Hence, the company
can maximise its net benefits through the choice of B, TI, and pat.

Max

B ,TI , pat

π BB = PD ⋅ G[ y BS (B;σ ), K (B;σ ), TI ( pat (B );σ )] − C ( y BS , B, TI , pat ) +

(7)

+ (1 − μ )E [Roy ( pat (B );σ )]

The three first order conditions are
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⎡ ∂G ∂y BS
⎤ ∂C
∂π BB
∂G ∂K
∂G ∂TI ∂pat
= PD ⎢
σK +
σ pat ⎥ −
+
σ+
∂B
∂K ∂B
∂yTI ∂pat ∂B
⎦ ∂B
⎣ ∂y BS ∂B

(8)

⎤
⎡ ∂Roy ∂pat
σ pat ⎥ = 0
+ (1 − μ )E ⎢
⎦
⎣ ∂pat ∂B

∂π BB
∂G
∂C
= PD
−
=0
∂TI
∂TI ∂TI

(9)

⎡ ∂Roy
⎤
∂π BB
∂C
∂G ∂TI
= PD
σ pat −
+ (1 − μ )E ⎢
σ pat ⎥ = 0
∂pat
∂pat
∂yTI ∂pat
pat
∂
⎣
⎦

(10)

Therefore, the BB optimal levels of B*, K*, and the optimal effort in getting a patent, pat* , must
simultaneously satisfy equations (8)-(10). Equation (8) states that the BB intends to stipulate the
bioprospecting contract, if and only if, the actual marginal revenues, denoted by
⎡ ∂G ∂y BS
⎤
∂G ∂TI ∂pat
∂G ∂K
PD ⎢
σ+
σK +
σ pat ⎥ , plus the expected marginal revenues,
∂yTI ∂pat ∂B
∂K ∂B
⎦
⎣ ∂y BS ∂B

denoted by

(1 − μ )E ⎡⎢ ∂Roy ∂pat σ pat ⎤⎥ ,
⎣ ∂pat ∂B

⎦

arising from the selling of drugs obtained by the

transformation of the screened samples, which are purchased in the bioprospecting contract, can
fully offset the marginal costs of writing this contract,

∂C
. Equation (9) states that the optimal
∂B

amount of investment is determined by the marginality condition. More interestingly, Equation (10)
shows that the BB has the incentive to patent its new products, and pharmaceutical inventions, as
long as its financial returns, which are expressed in terms of the value of increasing productivity,
PD

∂G ∂TI
σ pat , plus the additional, potential effect that patenting will bring on the expected
∂TI ∂pat

⎡ ∂Roy ∂pat
⎤
∂C
royalty payoff, (1 − μ )E ⎢
σ pat ⎥ , are larger than the total costs of patenting,
. It is
∂pat
⎣ ∂pat ∂B
⎦
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clear from Equation (10) that patenting has a positive impact on investments in technology, since
the research discoveries and pharmaceutical innovations are protected by the legislation. As a
consequence, the large investments will bring about rapid progress in the present technology for
drug development, which in turn, can increase the utilisation potential of genetic resources and their
value due to the reduced time and costs in screening for pharmaceutical and other uses (Craft and
Simpson 2001). Moreover, we can also consider the scenario where patenting may lead to create a
monopolistic position for the BB. In this case, the BB will significantly increase its market power.
This will be reflected in the possibility to set the drug market price. In formal terms, this is defined
by:

λ=

PD ( y BB , pat ) − PD ( y BB )
PD ( y BB , pat )

(

(11)

)

with λ > 0 , PD y BB , pat > PD ( y BB ) and PD ( y BB ) ≡ PD ( y BB , pat = 0 )

According to equation (11), patenting the new pharmaceutical products and innovations is
responsible for the determination of a “monopolistic price overcharge”, whose magnitude is
captured by λ , also denoted in the literature as price mark-up. Against this background, we can rewrite equation (10) as

∂π BB
⎡ ∂Roy
⎤
∂λ
∂C
∂G ∂TI
σ pat +
y BB −
+ (1 − μ )E ⎢
σ pat ⎥ = 0
= PD
∂pat
∂yTI ∂pat
∂pat
pat
∂
∂pat
⎣
⎦

(12)

Therefore, when the BB is legally allowed to patent the product, this effect can be used by the
company as a tool to increase its market power, and thus earn greater profits. The magnitude of this
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effect is given by

∂λ
y BB . This constitutes an additional incentive for the private company to
∂pat

endorse R&D, which was not originally foreseen in equation (10).

3. Discussion of the impacts of bioprospecting contracts and patenting on welfare
In the previous sections we have shown that bioprospecting contracts and patenting are significant
variables affecting the objective functions of the parties under consideration. The prospect of higher
individual profits, and market power, can stimulate the BS and BB to endorse bioprospecting and
BB to endorse patenting. The following analysis will formally assess the total welfare impacts
involved and their distribution among the stakeholders. Let us assume that the total welfare function
is given by the following Samuelson-Bergson additive function:

W = π BS + π BB + v( x, y BB , S )

W = p B (B;θ ) ⋅ F (s (θ ), L( B; θ ), T ( B; θ ) ) − C BS (s, L, T , B ) + μ ⋅ E [Roy ( pat )] +
+ PD ( y BB , pat ) ⋅ G[ y BS (B;σ ), K (B;σ ), TI ( pat (B );σ )] − C BB ( y BS , B, TI , pat ) +
+ (1 − μ )E [Roy ( pat (B );σ )] + v(x, y BB (B; pat ), B )

with PD > pB
or,

W = PD ( y BB , pat ) ⋅ G[ y BS (B; σ ), K (B; σ ), TI ( pat (B ); σ )] − C BS (s, L, T , B ) − C BB (B, TI , pat ) +

(13)

+ E [Roy ( pat (B ); σ )] + v(x, y BB (B; pat ), B )
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Equation (13)11 shows that the welfare function is given by the aggregation of BS and BB
objective functions. In addition, we also consider the consumer’s utility expressed in monetary
terms, denoted by v(.). The latter increases with the consumption of all other goods, x, and the
consumption of pharmaceutical products, whose market is characterised by monopolistic power due
to patenting. Finally, the consumer’s utility is also modelled as depending on B, and this may be
interpreted as signalling consumer’s motivation with respect to the writing of the bioprospecting
contract in terms of its contribution to the provision of impure altruistic, and/or aesthetic and/or
existence values. For example, this may reflect the consumer’s additional willingness to pay for the
market drug in the scenario where he, or she, is guaranteed that the respective production process is
characterised by the respect of the knowledge of local communities property rights. For this same
reason, the consumer feels good when buying this product since he, or she, is also “buying” moral
satisfaction or warm-glow as derived from such a “good” cause (see Andreoni 1990, Nunes and
Schokkaert 2003). Alternatively, this effect may reward the producer’s effort to protect the
degradation of local biodiversity and respective landscape, including avoiding bio-piracy12 actions.
It is important to note that the price of the bioprospecting contract, or the price of screened samples,

pB, is assumed to be smaller than the price of the successfully developed drugs, PD, which embeds
all the information and bio-technology values. The difference can be interpreted as added-value
resulting from the efforts that the BS puts forward in order to improve the quality of biotic

11

Since the revenue of the BS corresponds to the BB costs of buying screened samples, we can eliminate the first term
by deleting the BB cost component with respect to the yBS.
12

As an example of biopiracy, we report the following case. In 1995 the U.S. Department of Agriculture and a
pharmaceutical research firm received a patent on a technique to extract an anti-fungal agent from the Neem tree
(Azadirachta indica), which grows throughout India. Indian villagers have long understood the tree's medicinal value.
Although the patent had been granted on an extraction technique, the Indian press described it as a patent on the Neem
tree itself; the result was widespread public outcry, which was echoed throughout the developing world. Legal action by
the Indian government followed, with the patent eventually being overturned. Importantly, the pharmaceutical company
involved in the Neem case argued that as traditional Indian knowledge of the properties of the Neem tree had never
been published in an academic journal, such knowledge did not amount to "prior art" (prior art is the term used when
previously existing knowledge bars a patent). In response to biopiracy threats such as this, India has been translating
and publishing ancient manuscripts containing old remedies in electronic form. (see Sheva, 2006)
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information contained in their supplied samples. As Swanson (1994) noted, information and
insurance values are connected with the quality of the genetic resources.

A) The effects of the contract on social welfare:
Bearing in mind Equation (13), we are able to express the effect of the contract on social welfare as
follows:
⎡ ∂G ∂y BS
∂C
⎤
∂C
∂G ∂TI ∂pat
∂G ∂K
dW = PD ⎢
σ+
σK +
σ pat ⎥ dB − BS dB − BB dB +
∂yTI ∂pat ∂B
∂K ∂B
∂B
∂B
⎦
⎣ ∂y BS ∂B

⎡ ∂Roy ∂pat
⎤
σ pat ⎥ dB +
+ E⎢
∂
∂
pat
B
⎣
⎦

⎛ ∂v ∂y BB ∂v ⎞
⎜⎜
⎟dB
+
∂B ⎟⎠
⎝ ∂y BB ∂B

(14)

Equation (14) shows that the bioprospecting contract has several welfare impacts. A close
inspection of this equation shows that most of these are related to the objective function of the BB,
see Equation (8). This means that, from the selected welfare perspective, all the benefits that the BS
receives from the bioprospecting contracts are balanced by the BB costs of buying screened
samples. Therefore, these benefits do not appear in (14), they are simple transfers. However, this
component can be of relevance from a distributional point of view. Especially, when the social
planner attaches a higher welfare weight to BS, including the evaluation of the non-monetary
benefit-sharing effects accrued to the BS (e.g. technology transfer, internal personnel training,
capacity-building, and sharing of research results and biological databases). However, this
distributional welfare gain might generate additional and significant transaction costs (for instance,
the costs of monitoring the contract execution and/or enforcing the contract). This might jeopardise
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the efficiency of the governance structure and related efficiency gains and, in turn, drive the
contractors to re-adapt to a new governance structure that tends to minimise transaction costs.
In particular, from Equation (14) we can distinguish the following welfare impacts: (a)
⎡ ∂G ∂y BS
⎤
∂G ∂K
∂G ∂TI ∂pat
σK +
σ+
σ pat ⎥ , which corresponds to the BB marginal
PD ⎢
∂K ∂B
∂yTI ∂pat ∂B
⎦
⎣ ∂y BS ∂B

⎤
⎡ ∂Roy ∂pat
revenues effects; (b) E ⎢
σ pat ⎥ , which corresponds to the expected marginal royalty
⎦
⎣ ∂pat ∂B
revenues, that will be distributed among the BS and BB according to the μ share. The higher the

μ , the higher the transfer of expected marginal royalty revenues to the BS. In addition, we can see
that the contract has two effects on the consumer’s utility and, thus, welfare. First, such effects refer
to the impact of the bioprospecting contract on the supply of the drugs in the market, i.e.
∂v ∂y BB
∂v
. Since the marginal utility of the consumption of the drugs is non-negative,
≥ 0,
∂y BB ∂B
∂y BB

and the marginal effect of the bioprospecting contract on the production of drugs is also nonnegative,

∂y BB
∂v
≥ 0 , we can expect this effect to be positive. Second,
captures the marginal
∂B
∂B

impacts of the bioprospecting contract in terms of impure altruistic, aesthetic and/or existence
values to the consumers. Finally,

∂C BS
∂C BB
and
show that contracting is a costly activity for
∂B
∂B

both BS and BB, respectively, and thus negatively affects the welfare function.
To conclude, the overall effect on social welfare is unknown, but most likely expected to be
positive. This positive effect is strengthened by three main determinants: (1) the lower the
transaction cost; (2) the higher the benefit of the contract in terms of BB productivity and potential
royalty revenues; and (3) the higher the consumer’s valuation of the contract. The combination of
these results confirms the theoretical validity of the stylised facts discussed in Section 2, where
contracts were interpreted as cost-minimising governance structures to implement the CBD
principle. Against this background, the suggested policy recommendation is to respect the ‘invisible
31
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hand’ mechanism and let the contracts work, since according to TCE biodiversity sellers and
biodiversity buyers are the most proper agents to efficiently adapt to transaction costs.

B) The effects of patenting on social welfare:
Bearing in mind Equation (13), we are able to express the effect of the contract on social welfare as
follows:

⎡ ∂Roy
⎤
⎡
⎤
∂G ∂TI
∂λ
∂v ∂y BB
∂C
σ pat +
y BB ⎥ dpat + E ⎢
σ pat ⎥ dpat +
dpat −
dpat
dW = ⎢ PD
∂pat
∂y BB ∂pat
∂pat
⎣ ∂pat
⎦
⎣ ∂yTI ∂pat
⎦

where we have −

(15)

∂C
< 0 . This is interpreted as a negative impact on the social welfare and
∂pat

indicates the relevance of the costs of patent application and renewal fees for the new drug
products. In addition, patenting generates the following welfare impacts. First, the expression

PD

∂G ∂TI
σ pat refers to welfare benefits from patenting due to technological investments and
∂yTI ∂pat

respective productivity, and thus profitability, of the pharmaceutical sector. This may well signal
the well-known literature effect that points out that patents create incentives for R&D (see Heller
and Eisenberg 1998; Willison and MacLeod 2002). In this context, patents do encourage research
and may be essential for the success of drug development (Peeters and Van Pottelsberghe De La
Potterie 2006). Second, patenting is also responsible for the creation of a monopolistic market. A
patent holder achieves the monopolistic profits by being the only producer of the products since the
patent represents a legal barrier to entry. This effect is captured by

∂λ
y BB , which is interpreted as
∂pat

having a positive impact on social welfare. On the other hand, the positive effects of patenting on
the BB’s profits are counterbalanced by the negative impacts on consumer surplus. This effect is
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expressed by

∂y BB
∂v ∂y BB
, where the term
is negative since higher prices (and thus lower
∂pat
∂y BB ∂pat

quantities) due to patenting and applied by the BB monopolist will negatively affect consumer
surplus.13 Finally, the patenting generates a financial revenue in terms of royalty payments, captured
by

∂Roy
σ pat , which is interpreted as having a positive impact on social welfare. From the
∂pat

theoretical point of view, we cannot establish a priori the overall effect (sign) of patenting on social
welfare. The respective magnitude is a matter of empirical research.

5. Conclusions
The present paper contains an economic analysis of bioprospecting contracts. Given the background
information of pharmaceutical research and related bioprospecting activities, we first reviewed a
number of existing contracts worldwide in order to identify the main provisions and parties, namely
biodiversity seller (e.g. local governmental and/or international research institution) and
biodiversity buyer (e.g. private pharmaceutical company). Furthermore, we interpreted contracts in
the perspective of transaction costs theory. We then identified the pharmaceutical industry as a
private sector involved in bioprospecting activities, representing the largest global market of genetic
resource products. For this same reason, this stakeholder is identified as having an important role in
formulating the current bioprospecting contracts on the commercial use of genetic resources. Hence,
we shifted our research emphasis on the pharmaceutical industry.
By clarifying the pharmaceutical research process and the specific contractors, we gained
insight into the contract contents and the bioprospecting activities. These studies provide the
grounds for modelling the contractors’ objective functions and respective welfare impacts. Our
analysis provided the following results. First, long-term bioprospecting contracts were found to be

13

Furthermore, since patenting is here associated to the presence of a bioprospecting contract, in order to derive the net
consumer surplus one needs to take into account the positive effects in to consumers in terms of impure altruistic,
aesthetic and/or existence values, as described in the previous paragraph.
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an efficient transaction cost-minimising governance structure for the involved parties. Second,
modelling bioprospecting contracts has allowed us to create an original theoretical framework, that
explains the observed stylised facts, and to study and capture the different components of the
parties’ objective functions. Third, comparative static analysis revealed that the governance
structure has different, mixed impacts on social welfare. This is because the positive impacts
delivered by bioprospecting contracts are associated with the potential discovery of a new drug
product, productivity gains, non-monetary benefit sharing or transfers and royalty revenues. The
negative welfare impacts are derived from patenting activities which allow the legal creation of a
monopoly and the related well-known effect on the consumer surplus. Finally, the potential
redistribution effects are limited, and a potential enforcement of this objective may jeopardise the
desirability of the contract since this action would lead to a significant increase in the transaction
costs.
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